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Abstract 
Food is an area that receives little attention from psychologists, despite the fact that it provides 
many interesting situations and dilemmas through which human activity and development can be 
examined. Currently – at least in the WEIRD (western, educated, industrial, rich and democratic) 
countries (Henrich et al., 2010), – these activities are an important object of normative discourses 
and injunctions about how we should behave as consumers and how we should eat, notably when it 
comes to products of animal origin and meat in particular. In these countries, a large majority of 
people regularly consumes meat. Vegetarianism can be seen as a deviant behavior to this norm 
(Boyle, 2011), that provokes reactions as it questions the taken-for-granted normality and necessity 
of meat consumption (Larue, 2015). However, the issue of meat consumption also intersects with 
many other normative discourses, such as the imperatives to be an ethical consumer or to be a 
hedonist. In this paper, I examine how people orient themselves in relation to these norms and 
possibly take distance from some of them. More specifically I propose to do so through the notion 
of positioning. Position and positioning are notions that are increasingly used and discussed in 
psychology. The theorization of these notions is recent, and thus quite disparate (Gülerce et al., 
2014), although a few scholars worked on possible synthesis of different traditions (Gillespie & 
Martin, 2014; Raggatt, 2015). I argue that examining positioning processes in relation to normative 
discourses and behaviors constitutes a way to understand the relation between the person and some 
social norms, and that this use will also contribute to deepen the conceptualization of positioning. I 
draw on empirical work conducted with people who recently changed their habits of consumption 
of food of animal origin. The questions I examine are: how do people position themselves in the 
normative and contested world of consumption of food of animal origin, and what are the processes 
possibly allowing them to question and transgress the norms in this area.  
 
Keywords: positioning, norms, taking distance, meat consumption, vegetarianism 
 
“As a vegetarian, we never do well enough”   •   185 
 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGIES • Vol. 1, No. 1 • 2021 
www.istp-irtp.com 
Introduction 
Food is an area that receives little attention from psychologists, despite the fact that it 
provides many interesting situations and dilemmas through which human activity and 
development can be examined. In particular, one can find in the history of food habits many 
interesting examples of how humans creatively cope with the biological and environmental 
constrains of both eating processes and food production (Rozin, 2007). Currently – at least 
in the WEIRD (western, educated, industrial, rich and democratic) countries (Henrich et al., 
2010), – these activities are also an important object of normative discourses and injunctions 
about how we should behave as consumers and how we should eat. The eater and consumer 
behavior might also be object of measurement, if we think for instance about the calculation 
of the Carbone footprint of certain diets, or devices allowing to count how many calories or 
proteins you need and consume. In the WEIRD countries, one area of food that is nowadays 
at the center of normative discourses and debates is the consumption of products of animal 
origin (and meat in particular). In these countries, a large majority of people regularly 
consumes meat. Examining the justification for meat consumption among those who eat it, 
researchers identified what they call the 4Ns: meat consumption is presented as necessary, 
normal, nice and natural (Piazza et al., 2015). Vegetarianism can be seen as a deviant 
behavior to this norm (Boyle, 2011), that provokes reactions as it questions the taken-for-
granted normality and necessity of meat consumption (Larue, 2015). However, the issue of 
meat consumption also intersects with many other normative discourses, such as the 
imperatives to be an ethical consumer, to be a hedonist or to be coherent in one’s choices. 
In this paper, I examine how people orient themselves in relation to these norms and 
possibly take distance from some of them. More specifically I propose to do so through the 
notion of positioning. Position and positioning are notions that are increasingly used and 
discussed in psychology, notably in Harré’s Positioning Theory and in dialogical 
approaches. The theorization of these notions is recent, and thus quite disparate (Gülerce et 
al., 2014), although a few scholars worked on possible synthesis of the different traditions 
(Gillespie & Martin, 2014; Raggatt, 2015). I argue that examining positioning processes in 
relation to normative discourses and behaviors constitutes a way to understand the relation 
between the person and some social norms, and that this use will also contribute to deepen 
the conceptualization of positioning. The questions I examine in this paper are: how do 
people position themselves in the normative (and contested) world of consumption of food 
of animal origin, and what are the processes possibly allowing them to question and 
transgress the norms in this area. I draw on empirical work conducted with people who 
recently changed their habits of consumption of food of animal origin into vegetarism, in 
order to study the different aspects at play in the positioning process in relation to the 
identified norms.  
Positioning or understanding how people navigate the 
world 
According to socio-cultural and cultural-historical perspectives, understanding the dynamic 
interaction between the individual and his or her environment is a core issue. This has been 
theorized in many different ways, and I will focus here only on one particular concept that 
aimed at capturing these interrelations, namely positioning. This framing is based on 
Benson’s (2001) work, which conceptualizes the self “primarily as a locative system, a 
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means of reference and orientation in worlds of space–time (perceptual worlds) and in 
worlds of meaning and place–time (cultural worlds)” (2001, p. 4). 
Benson’s approach is constructed on the assumption that location is fundamental in the 
development and functioning of the self, as “[w]ithout being placed or located I would not 
be, and where I find myself implaced influences not just the fact of my being but also its 
nature. Where, when and who are mutually constitutive” (2001, p. 3‑4). Location implies 
both a material dimension that refers to the place occupied in space time, and a symbolic 
dimension that refers to the way the person is situated or situates her or himself regarding 
different discourses. At this level, the world is conceptualized as constituted by meanings, 
and this is the main area of interest for cultural psychology, although, obviously, material 
and symbolic location are interdependent and happen simultaneously. It is to study in 
particular the orientation and location in the symbolic world that Benson (2001) refers to 
the notion of positioning, and more precisely that he draws on Harré and his colleagues’ 
work labelled Positioning Theory. 
While the notion of positioning was originally used to provide a spatial description of a 
point in a configuration, it became more widespread as a term in  psychology notably 
through Davies and Harré’s (1990) work (Gülerce et al., 2014; Raggatt, 2015). Their 
approach is anchored in discursive psychology and focuses mainly on interpersonal verbal 
interactions. Moreover, positioning is understood in this frame as a form of interpersonal 
negotiation of rights and duties (Harré et al., 2009). Positioning theory and the term 
positioning were developed as an alternative to the more static notion of role (Davies & 
Harré, 1990), as “the concept of positioning, anchored in a fine grained analysis of 
discourse, reveals that people give, receive, resist, and claim subject positions, often all 
within a short space of time or while they are ostensibly in the same role” (Gillespie & 
Martin, 2014, p. 73). However, discursive psychologists are not the only ones using the 
notion of positioning. Dialogical approaches constitute another theoretical tradition that 
refers to positioning and positions, and among them Dialogical Self Theory is particularly 
well-known with its notion of I-positions (see Hermans, 2001; Hermans et al., 1992). 
According to this theory, the spatial dimension of the mind is a metaphor (Gülerce et al., 
2014) allowing the description of intrapersonal psychological movements between different 
positions in what is called the landscape of the mind. According to Hermans, “the dialogical 
self can be described as a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions in the landscape of the mind” 
(2002, p. 147). Moreover, “the I has the possibility to move from one spatial position to 
another in accordance with changes in situation and time” (2001, p. 248). Several authors 
see these approaches as complementary, mainly because the first one, Positioning Theory, 
focuses more on interpersonal dynamics, while the second one, Dialogical Self Theory, 
concentrates on intrapersonal movements. Thus, Raggat (2015) argues that both should be 
used in order to get a more comprehensive analysis of a situation. Gillespie and Martin 
(2014) also propose a combination of both, but integrate in addition an ontological 
developmental perspective, highlighting how material and social positioning movements 
constitute the basis for perspective taking and thus for more abstract forms of positioning 
across ontogeny. 
Based on this literature, and in particular on distinctions proposed by Benson (2001) and 
Raggatt (2015), I propose here to understand positioning in the following way: 
 
Positioning designates the way the person relates to (socio-material and discursive) elements that 
constitute the world (notably objects, behaviors, institutions, persons – including him or herself, 
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discourses). It implies that this element exists in the subjective landscape of the person. The 
relation notably takes the form of a recognition or denial of its importance and/or of its value 
(Gfeller, 2020, p. 96). 
 
Moreover, I consider that humans position themselves and are positioned by others at 
different levels, notably: 
• Socio-materially, by which I refer to the position in place-time (see Benson, 2001) but 
also to the activity in and on the concrete material world (see Gillespie & Martin, 
2014); 
• Socio-discursively, through verbal interactions, notably through the way the person 
presents her or himself or the way she or he speaks about something. This might be 
more or less closely related to a rather stable social role (as in Gillespie & Martin, 
2014) or take a more dynamic and changing forms (as in Davies & Harré, 1990); 
• Morally, by which I refer to the dimension of the positioning that relates to (often 
implicit) evaluations and assessments about what we should do or not, what is 
good/bad, what is important/unimportant (Benson, 2001), which has also been 
theorized by Harré and his colleagues (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré et al., 2009) as 
rights and duties. 
These different levels might overlap and interact (more or less harmoniously). For instance, 
a person might order the vegetarian menu (socio-discursive and material positioning) and 
explain to the people eating with her that she is vegetarian because she thinks that the 
suffering following from the meat industry is intolerable (socio-discursive and moral 
positioning). In the following, my aim is to turn towards the study of concrete everyday 
activities in order to test the heuristic power of this theoretical proposition, with the 
assumption that understanding the conduct of everyday life is a necessity for psychology if 
it wants to escape to an (epistemologically problematic) worldlessness (Teo, 2016). 
Moreover, I consider that the worlds navigated by humans are – at least to some extent – 
normative. On one hand, patterns (recognized by humans or even created by them) allow 
humans to find some stability which will allow them to orient themselves in the world 
(Valsiner, 2008). This relates to the notion of normativity as what is “normal”, what is 
statistically the most probable. On the other hand, humans also tend to produce moral norms 
establishing what should or should not be and evaluate themselves and their actions 
according to these norms (Brinkmann, 2016). Norms will thus play the role of indicators 
showing in which direction to navigate. Although the authors quoted above on the notion of 
positioning did not, as far as I know, refer to norms, they acknowledge that the world in 
which the positioning is done has a certain structure, regularities and (in particular for Harré 
and Benson) a moral charge. This constrains, orients and limits the individual’s power to 
elaborate his or her own positioning. From the point of view of a psychological approach 
that is sensitive to the first person’s perspective and to concrete everyday activity, the 
question that arises then is how this positioning concretely happens in everyday activities, 
and more specifically how the relation to norm(s) is subjectively experienced and negotiated 
in a case where the person questions a dominant norm? 
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Meat consumption as a norm 
I argue here that food related activities provide a particularly fruitful area in order to study 
these dynamics of positioning and its challenges (Rozin, 2007 proposes a similar argument, 
but more broadly regarding psychology). Indeed, food related activities are at the same time 
responding to individual nutritional necessities and highly symbolic, socially shared 
systems with a moral component (Anderson, 2005; Mintz, 1996). As food related activities 
encompass a very broad range of issues and activities, I will focus on the consumption of 
products of animal origin in what follows (with meat playing a central role among these 
products). Products of animal origin indeed constitute a particularly interesting category of 
foods as they are most likely to be either central in a culinary system (a dish is traditionally 
organized around meat) or linked to disgust and taboo. In addition to that, I will concentrate 
on the situation in Switzerland, where products of animal origin, and meat in particular, are 
traditionally a quite important part of food culture, but at the same time there are currently 
debates questioning this habit. 
The critics against meat consumption (and sometimes more generally against products of 
animal origin) that can be found in Switzerland currently articulate around three main issues: 
animal ethics, the environmental impact of the production of food of animal origin and the 
impact on health. Regarding each of these issues, a variety of positions are represented, 
covering the whole range of possibilities between advocating strict veganism and pro-meat 
arguments. The means for provoking a change are also an object of debate between those 
who argue for civil disobedience, those who favor traditional political tools such as popular 
initiative  and those who argue that this is a personal choice that should not be politically 
regulated. 
Despite of these debates and an increasing presence of vegetarianism and even veganism in 
the public sphere (in what follows, I use “veg*ism” in order to designate the whole range of 
diets that are usually considered as forms of vegetarianism and veganism), meat 
consumption stays a largely dominant norm among the Swiss population generally 
speaking. I argue that this normativity presents different aspects. First of all, there is a 
statistical dimension. The data concerning meat consumption and vegetarianism clearly 
show that meat consumption is “normal” in the sense that it is largely part of the 
population’s habits. In 2016, the average consumption of products of animal origin per 
person was of 315 kg, which corresponds to 863 grams per day. Among these, they were 49 
kg of meat and 8 kg of fish, thus slightly less than 1 kg of meat per person per week (Office 
fédéral de la statistique, 2018). Despite of a small decrease over the last years, the average 
consumption stays largely above the national nutritional recommendations (Office fédéral 
de la sécurité alimentaire et des affaires vétérinaires, 2017). On the other hand, 5.7% of the 
population declares eating meat less than once a week, which represents a clear minority 
(Office fédéral de la statistique, 2019). 
A second (obviously related) dimension of the normativity of meat consumption was 
highlighted with the notion of carnism, initially proposed by Melanie Joy (Larue, 2015). 
According to her, 
 
“we don’t see meat eating as we do vegetarianism – as a choice, based on a set of assumptions 
about animals, our world, and ourselves. Rather, we see it as given, the ´natural´ thing to do, the 
way things have always been and the way things will always be. We eat animals without thinking 
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about what we are doing and why because the belief system that underlies this behavior is 
invisible. This invisible system is what I call carnism” (Joy, 2011, p. 29).  
 
In a similar way than the notion of patriarchy aimed at designating, making visible and thus 
possibly challenging a largely unquestioned organization of the world, this word carnism 
was proposed as a way to make visible the taken-for-granted nature of meat consumption 
and thus to question it.  
 
"This vision of the world is so anchored, so familiar, that nobody thought about giving it a name. 
As invisible as was patriarchy before feminists named and fought it, carnism escapes to any 
critical examination exactly because of its omnipresence” (Larue, 2015, p. 9‑10, my translation).  
 
Carnism is based on implicit and arbitrary distinctions between animals that we can eat and 
animals that are not edible, as well as on the ignorance or the underestimation of the animals’ 
suffering and/or the environmental impact of meat (Larue, 2015). Based on that, some 
authors suggest that we (at least in the so called WEIRD countries, see Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010) live in a carninormative world (Bramble & Fischer, 2016). 
Thirdly, in addition to this taken-for-granted nature of meat consumption, a moral 
dimension might also sometimes be highlighted. This is the case notably when there is a 
reference to a certain order of the world, such as the idea that humans eat meat because this 
is how it is and should be. To that extent, meat consumption is inscribed in a certain 
understanding of the universe and of the place humans occupy in it (Larue, 2015). One 
example of this type of position could be to state that human should eat meat because it 
reminds them of their belonging to the animal kingdom and thus of their mortality (Lestel, 
2011). Authors also point toward the role of religions, in particular Christianism, in the 
shaping and spreading of the idea that (some) animals are “made for” being eaten or (today 
more acceptable) that it is in the natural order of the world for humans to use/exploit animals 
(Larue, 2015). 
Piazza et al. (2015) conducted an empirical study showing that these different dimensions 
can be found in people’s justification of their meat consumption. Interested in the so-called 
meat paradox (the moral conflict between enjoying meat and the wish to avoid harming 
animals), they examined the way meat eaters rationalize their meat consumption. They 
showed that to the instruction “Please give three reasons why you think it is OK to eat meat” 
(Piazza et al., 2015, p. 116), the most frequent answers could be associated to the categories 
meat is necessary (nutritional argument), natural (ontological statement about human 
beings), normal (everyone does it) and nice (tasty), which the authors call the four Ns. Thus, 
in addition to the different dimensions of normativity presented above (which are also those 
highlighted by Joy, 2011), Piazza et al. (2015) add the importance of taste.  
If meat consumption is a norm in all these different ways, veg*ism on the opposite can be 
seen as a questioning and critique of this norm, through action and/or through words. "In 
front of a vegetarian or a vegan, the carnivore person must notice that there is an alternative 
and that he might henceforth choose to kill or to spare animals, to destroy or to preserve 
nature" (Larue, 2015, p. 256, my translation). In other words, veg*ism questions the taken-
for-granted habit of meat consumption through the existence of another way of eating. 
Beyond the displaying of an alternative, this also implies important dynamics of 
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interpersonal moral judgement (Minson & Monin, 2012) as well as broader representations 
of humans, animals and the world they live in and are part of, as underlined by Larue:  
 
“the debates arising from this diet thus whip up an unexpected number of concerns on the human 
being, on his origin, on his prerogatives and on his duties, on his place in the universe, on the 
needs of his body, on the rushes of his soul” (2015, p. 12, my translation). 
 
As a psychologist, my interest is in understanding how people navigate this carninormative 
world and how they might question and/or transgress the norm of meat consumption. 
Methods 
I conducted a study on positioning towards vegetarianism between 2015 and 2020 in the 
French speaking part of Switzerland. Its aim was to provide a socio-cultural psychological 
perspective on the issue of meat consumption and vegetarianism, based on the 
acknowledgement of meat production and consumption as an important societal challenge 
and increasingly debated issue in this historical-cultural context. Moreover, the choice of 
the topic was motivated by the interest of food related activities as one domain where the 
articulation between the person and her or his environment is very deeply at stake in multiple 
ways. Participants were 10 adults, six women and four men, aged between 25 and 67. The 
main criteria of selection was that their foodway trajectory was marked by an important 
change in food habits in relation to the consumption of products of animal origin. Moreover, 
at least some aspects of this change had to be recent or even still ongoing. The change in 
food habits is considered here as a form of repositioning. Beyond these criteria, the changes 
were various, and included for instance changes from carnist to more or less strict vegetarian 
diets, from vegetarian to carnist diet, or from vegetarian to more or less strict vegan diets. 
The way participants labelled themselves (vegetarian, vegan, flexitarian,…) or resisted to 
do so was not a criteria of selection. 
The method consisted in the combination of three research settings: a narrative interview, a 
dialogical experiment and a filmed observation. As a complement, I also collected material 
(newspapers, flyers, pictures of graffiti…) available in the public space related to meat and 
veg*ism. As what I present here is based only on the analysis of the narrative interview and 
the dialogical experiment, I will focus merely on these two settings. They were used with 
all of the participants. The narrative interview aimed at provoking and collecting the 
narration of the change(s) as the person experienced it (or them) subjectively (drawing on 
Schütze, 1983). It allows me to access to data related to change on the ontogenetic level. 
While the initial focus of my question (to the interviewees) is on events and practices related 
to the foodway, I am also interested in the meaning of these for the interviewee and, more 
globally, his or her opinions and reasons. The aim of the dialogical experiment was to 
prompt socio-discursive positioning, in relation to different positions regarding meat and 
vegetarianism. Participants were asked to imagine that they participated in a dinner, during 
which two of their neighbours would express contrasting points of view regarding a specific 
aspect of meat or vegetarianism. These were provided under the form of short written texts, 
which I consider as expressions of positions (based on de Saint-Laurent, 2018). I asked them 
to share with me what they think about them, what they were likely to respond an the extent 
to which they were familiar with this position. A thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
of the data allowed me to identify the topics that are relevant to the participants (e.g. animal 
“As a vegetarian, we never do well enough”   •   191 
 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGIES • Vol. 1, No. 1 • 2021 
www.istp-irtp.com 
ethics or environmental impact). This analysis was enhanced with the coding of the person’s 
positioning regarding these topics as well as the identification of tensions between diverse 
positions (inspired by Aveling et al., 2015). Based on this, I conducted a more detailed 
analysis of some particular positioning movements and tensions, identified as particularly 
representative or as contrasting or extreme cases. In the next section, I will present a few 
ways in which participants position themselves in discordance with a dominant norm and 
briefly discuss them. This analysis is structured by the four N’s and centred around the issue 
of meat consumption. However, I argue that with this approach, important dimensions of 
the positioning process stay unaddressed. In the following section, I will thus examine some 
other aspects of the positioning process that are less directly related to meat consumption, 
notably participants’ considerations about knowledge production, coherence or normality. 
Voicing alternative discourses to the four N’s 
The analysis of the data collected provides material based on which I can now examine what 
allows the participants to develop an alternative positioning to the normative one of the meat 
eater. I will use the four N’s in order to structure my argument, using selected extracts in 
which participants challenge one of the norms. All of the four norms were challenged by at 
least some participants, but not all of the participants positioned critically towards all the 
norms. The extent to which they take distance from the norm might also vary. In the first 
extract, the participant is challenging the representation of meat as natural. 
 
Extract 1:  
 “what bothers me in fact is uh (.) it- it’s mainly uh the way animals are treated, (.) let’s say, uhm: 
(.) it’s the fact of producing meat like plastic in fact it’s like one would produce uh shoes or t-
shirts or whatever (.) there is this whole production line that must be as profitable as possible, 
(.)” [Léa, narrative interview] 
 
In this extract, Léa presents meat as the product of an industrial system, “like plastic” or 
“shoes”, thus something artificial that cannot, to her, be considered as natural. Further in the 
interview, she also argues that life deserves more respect, thus drawing on an opposition 
between life, which can be associated to what is natural, and the industrial production 
system to which she associates meat. Thus, she does not question the idea that meat 
consumption is natural in an absolute way, but limits her questioning to the industrial 
production of meat. The moral positioning (“this form of production is bad”) stays largely 
implicit in this extract, however she expresses her disagreement when stating that this 
bothers her. 
In extract 2, the participant goes against the idea of eating meat as being something normal. 
In Piazza et al.’s (2015) definition, the term normal is specifically related to the idea of the 
majority, thus to a statistical dimension of normality. However, it is precisely on the issue 
of the number of people that Gaël draws in order to explain his choice to avoid meat. 
 
Extract 2:  
 “when I stopped eating meat, it was also for environmental reasons, […] for me yeah the 
question of how we would do for all of us to live (2) uh (.) because clearly we could not all of us 
the whole planet be nourished by eating meat” [Gaël, narrative interview] 
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Gaël draws here on the issue of the resources that are necessary in order to produce meat, a 
problem that was already raised in the 1970’s (see Lappé and Hahn’s Diet for a small planet, 
1971), but that is still a critical challenge (Gerber et al., 2013). Thus, for this participant it 
is exactly the fact that meat consumption is normal (in the sense of being the diet of a large 
number of people) that is problematic and this lead him to avoid this product. He links his 
specific socio-material positioning (to stop eating meat) with an understanding of collective 
possibilities (“we could not all”), implicitly related with a moral positioning regarding social 
justice (what one should do – a position that is explicit in other parts of the data). 
In extract 3, Aurélia positions herself against the idea that eating meat would be necessary 
for nutritional reasons. 
 
Extract 3: 
 “but I know that there are many more proteins in vegetables than we think, (.) and uh (2) so it’s 
it’s a wrong idea to think that there is only meat and that that: you absolutely need to eat meat in 
order to be in good health or whatever” [Aurélia, narrative interview] 
 
In this extract, the dominant discourse presenting meat as necessary is addressed in a very 
direct and explicit way, perhaps because Aurélia encountered this discourse regularly (as 
many other participants did) and that she spent quite a lot of time investigating the issue in 
order to be able to provide an argumentative answer and develop her socio-discursive 
positioning as a vegetarian. Finally, the fourth extract illustrates a discourse that is clearly 
not considering meat as something nice. 
 
Extract 4: 
 “it was horrible to make a roast, this huge quantity of meat, (.) that smelled:: after each meal of 
roast: uh I washed my hair changed my clothes, ((laughing))” [Marilou, narrative interview] 
 
Marilou highlights the disgust she experiences when preparing a roast, which lasts after the 
preparation and meal itself through the smell in her  hair and  clothes. Nevertheless, during 
the period she is talking about, she prepared roasts almost on a weekly basis, as it was the 
habitual Sunday meal in her family, which her husband and children enjoyed.  
In these four extracts, the participants position themselves in ways that are divergent from 
the majoritarian discourses on meat consumption. Regarding extracts 1 to 3, it is clear 
through the larger analysis of the interviews that the participants became familiar with 
alternative discourses as they encountered them (sometimes actively looking for 
information) in their environment. The question of how and when a certain alternative 
discourse becomes particularly relevant to a person goes beyond this paper, however this 
allows to underline the role of the presence of a plurality of discourses (see also Billig, 1988; 
Zittoun, 2013) in the possibility of emergence of alternative positionings on the 
microgenetic level and of new positions on the ontogenetic level. However, regarding 
extract 4, this explanation is not convincing (also when examining more broadly the data 
related to this person). Moreover, in the case of this person and based on the data collected 
with her, there seems not to be anyone who could have played a role in a form of 
socialization of taste (Ochs et al., 1996). The emergence of such an experience of disgust 
stays difficult to understand, however it highlights the role of subjective embodied 
experience in the development of alternative voices to the dominant discourse. Regarding 
positioning processes, it is also interesting to notice that participants take distance from the 
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dominant norms in different ways, based on shared knowledge (extract 3) or based on 
feelings (extract 4), attacking the presuppositions of the norm (extract 1), the consequences 
we draw from it (extract 2) or whether its content is right or wrong (extract 3). Given the 
interview situation, all of them position themselves on the socio-discursive level, however 
socio-materiel and moral positionings can also be evoked. 
To sum up, when trying to understand the issue of positioning regarding norms, I identified 
a dominant discourse tidily related with a practice that is largely shared and taken-for-
granted (in the Swiss context) and I showed that some people, drawing on their personal 
experience and the alternative discourses they encountered, position themselves in ways that 
are not aligned with the dominant discourse and practice. However, the analysis of the data 
presented here lead to identify several other aspects in the positioning process that seem to 
play an important role, but that are not directly related to these discourses and arguments.  
Beyond meat and its impact: some other aspects in the 
experience of positioning 
I will focus in this section on one participant, Aurélia, in order to illustrate a few other 
aspects that seem to play a crucial role in the positioning. Interestingly, these are not 
specifically related to the debates on meat and its implications. Indeed, during the interviews 
and the dialogical experiment, all the participants spent also an important amount of time 
speaking about social relations, about what they consider as normal, possible and/or easy, 
about knowledge and about coherence (with oneself). I argue that the presence of these 
aspects in the data shows the importance they have subjectively for the participants, and 
more specifically that they convey other norms that articulate in the positioning movements 
of the person with the one’s more directly related to products of animal origin.  
Aurélia has a vegetarian diet for 4.5 years. She currently follows this diet in a strict way, 
however this has not always been the case and the change of diet was progressive. She also 
avoids other products of animal origin, although not systematically, and aims at following 
a strict vegan diet in the future. She calls herself a vegetarian and says she would like to 
become a vegan. Her trajectory of practices (socio-material positionings) is thus rather linear 
and is oriented towards a progressive avoidance of all products of animal origin. The main 
reason she gives for this dietary change is related to animal ethics, and she seems to have a 
rather stable and clear moral and socio-discursive positioning regarding the consumption of 
products of animal origin: it is bad and should be avoided. The following extract comes 




“I used to eat avocados, […] people who eat meat in general they say yes, (.) but avocados, : (.) 
it wreaks devastation in Mexico, : because : (.) it’s not wrong, now but (.) I have the impression 
that (.) as a vegetarian we never do well enough, (.) and we always have uh : we will never be 
perfect in fact in fact they expect us to be perfect […] while we just try to : to be a bit : more a 
bit more kind and to do good around us, but it’s never enough, […] and if it’s not at the level of 
food one will say that we take the plane, : and that this is polluting, : and that we have a car and 
so we will never : we will never be perfect also [...] ” [Aurélia, dialogical experiment] 
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In this extract, the way social interactions can be challenging for vegetarians clearly appears. 
She reports the (generalized) voice of “people who eat meat” and highlights how she 
perceives this voice, in particular the perception and the expectations that are articulated by 
it, according to her. The “it’s not wrong, now but (.)” indicates a tension that is not a strict 
opposition, but that leads her to discuss perfection, an issue that is not explicitly raised by 
the reported voice. Through the notion of perfection, she introduces a discussion on what is 
enough, to what extent a person should be coherent and what is actually possible. Those are 
all related to moral norms stating what should be done, and in this extract, she positions 
herself socio-discursively towards them, discussing what we should do in relation with what 
we can and could do. Is it enough to be vegetarian if one can also avoid buying food that is 
not local? If one refers to environmental arguments in favor of vegetarianism (socio-
discursive positioning), is it allowed to take the plane (a socio-material positioning which 
has a high environmental impact) and thus not to be fully coherent regarding one’s 
environmental impact? What are the limits of one’s possibilities, and thus what imperfection 
can we tolerate – or in other words how do we articulate what we can, what we could and 
what we should do?  
The next extract follows almost immediately extract 5, and Aurélia is now speaking more 
specifically about herself, using the pronoun “I”.  
 
Extract 6: 
 “I do my best, well I try to I try to separate: [waste] I try to not to consume too much well then 
it’s an approach uh (.) well I try to do uh (2) to do uh as much as possible, [..] after there are 
things I don’t know yet that it’s maybe not good, […] but there I try to stay informed : (.) about 
all that,” [Aurélia, dialogical experiment] 
 
In this extract, she elaborates on her positioning as a vegetarian, in answer to the voice of 
the “people who eat meat”. She defends her position despite its lack of perfection in several 
ways. First of all, the phrases she uses “I do my best” and “as much as possible” carry the 
implication that she has limits. In other words, she makes an ontological statement about 
human being which excludes perfection, again articulating implicitly “could’s” and 
“should’s”. Secondly, she draws on intentionality (“I try to”, a socio-discursive and moral 
positioning) rather than performance (“we don’t do well enough”, a socio-material 
positioning). Thirdly, she points to a lack of knowledge as an explanation for her 
imperfection (which can also be seen as one specific limit of human beings and thus related 
to the first point). Finally, when she uses (in extract 5) the words “a bit more kind”, she 
actually introduces an alternative reference point of evaluation to “perfection”. Indeed, 
implicitly, these words imply a “more kind than someone” and thus allow her to present the 
vegetarian positioning as more valuable than when using “perfection” as a reference point. 
Thus, we can observe in these two extracts that the positioning as a vegetarian is not only 
related to debates regarding meat and its impact, but involves also various other issues that 
appear to play a quite central role in the way the positioning is elaborated during the 
interviews and experiments. Moreover, the fact that participants spent a significant amount 
of time on them during the interview and experiment lead us to argue that they occupy an 
important place in the subjective experience of positioning. The distinction between socio-
material, socio-discursive and moral positionings allows us to identify tensions and 
interplays between these different types of positionings. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I proposed to use the notion of positioning in order to examine the way 
individuals orient themselves in a field where a clearly dominant norm exists - namely meat 
consumption in the context of Switzerland – and the way people adopting a veg*an diet 
navigate this field. In order to do so, I focused on people who take distance from this norm, 
through their practices and discourse. Before I moved to the data presentation and analysis, 
I clarified different dimensions of this norm: the statistic dimension, the fact that it is largely 
unquestioned and the moral aspect. Then, firstly, I used examples in which people clearly 
question one of the arguments that is usually evoked in order to justify meat consumption. 
Through this, I underlined the importance of the presence of alternative discourses on which 
to draw in order to take distance, but also the necessity to consider individual embodied 
experience (in this case, of disgust). Secondly, I examined in more details the way a person 
elaborates her positioning regarding meat consumption and vegetarianism in dialogue with 
others, and highlighted the importance of other dimensions in the positioning process than 
the arguments usually considered in the debates around meat consumption. I underlined 
notably the relation to perfection and human limits, the relation to knowledge and the focus 
on intention rather than performance. I argue that all of these dimensions are related to a 
normative aspect, a “should”, and thus that the person elaborates and defends her position 
in a complex and subtle way, articulating socio-material, socio-discursive and moral 
positionings, at the crossroad of different “should’s” and “could’s” (implied notably when 
discussing the limits of human possibilities). 
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